20c • JULY 12, 1954

Senator Douglas Talks Taxes

New Republic

SECRET SCIENCE

The head of our leading atomic research laboratory warns that U.S. obsession with secrecy can slow up scientific progress and endanger national security

—PAGE 6

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

T. R. B.

★

Washington Wire

Congress will quit at the end of July, there will be a brief vacation in August and the big fall election campaign will start in September. We expect Democrats to score a victory. The public is as friendly as ever to Eisenhower personally, though he's been a bit of a disappointment to many who voted for him because he can't seem to get control of things. As to the Republicans in Congress who squeaked in with Ike —they never were popular. They are less popular now, we guess, than two years ago.

Watching Washington from a distance the public gets the idea that this Congress is always trying to hobble the likeable Ike. There's the McCarthy business. It doesn't make either Ike or Congress more popular. Then again, the record of the 83rd Congress hasn't been exactly progressive. It gave away the offshore oil. The new tax bill is loaded on the side of corporations and stockholders. The President had some fine internationalist ideas about tariffs and "trade-not-aid," but the GOP blocked him and he weakly yielded.

There's another item, too. Most of the newspapers don't know it yet but the biggest policy change made by the new Administration involves power. Ever since Teddy Roosevelt, the government has been the watchdog of public interest against the power lobby. Now Ike is right in there battling for the private utilities, not only against TVA ("creeping socialism") but on Bonneville, Hell's Canyon, the Missouri River Basin, the Southwest Power Administration and elsewhere. It's an uncomfortable fact, but Ike is surrounded by power trust people. There are 3.5 million members of farm co-ops today, many of them Republicans, and they don't like it and can't understand it. Signs are, opposition is building up. Ike is likeable, but he has no mandate to turn the clock back. He isn't up this year but the GOP Congress is.

There are hints of GOP desperation. That's how we interpret the Nixon speech out at Milwaukee assailing Acheson for "losing" China. It came right in the midst of the Churchill-Eisenhower talks, attacking everything Churchill stood for. It was a pretty low performance. Of course the GOP-GHQ put Dicky up to it. We never saw poor Ike flounder so as when reporters skillfully needled him on Nixon's speech at last week's press conference. No, he hadn't read the speech, he said in effect, but Nixon is a very splendid American. "Did he represent your views?" Ike replied, uncomfortably, that it was his job to look at America today, not the past, and to look ahead. . . .

All of which means that Ike will be left in his noble posture while the GOP tries to counter the disagreeable loss of Indo-China by getting more political mileage out of "Acheson." Two years from now we predict the GOP will be using McCarthy again. Perhaps before then. Even now Chairman Richard Simpson of the GOP Congressional Campaign Committee told a New York TV audience, June 28, "We can elect more Republicans if we use McCarthy" throughout the country.

What did Churchill accomplish here? Subtle things, we believe, not specific things. The gloomy fact is that Anglo-American policies still diverge. But the old man came over after US politicians had competed themselves into a sort of a hysterical breast-beating crescendo about how loyal they are and how much they hate Communist Russia and Communist China. With a certain splendor of performance Winnie let a lot of hot air out of this situation. Americans will think about what he said for a long time. Maybe he is right, maybe Russians do want "knick-knacks" in their homes, maybe we should have a "really good try" at peaceful co-existence. . . . Churchill was the one man who could say such things and command the ear of America and not be nabbed by the McCarthy Committee.

Personally, this fallible column can't say that either the British or American position is all right or all wrong. The British are not hysterical, thank heaven, but on the other hand they are tempted to rationalize a position of weakness in Indo-China. The United States has a counter-position there that is logical enough, but it is ruining its case by hysteria, by brandishing the H-bomb, by countenancing McCarthy and childishly refusing to recognize that Red China is here to stay. Each nation tends to smugness, moral superiority and a refusal to recognize the political realities of the other. The intangible effect on these conditions of the visit of the prime minister—stooped, wise, cherubic, mugging like any actor, negligently defying all the American political conventions, drinking brandy in public, dragging on a big cigar, making his V-sign, delivering homely wisdom or majestic phrases through an impediment—the effect of these things on public opinion, we imagine, are the lasting elements of this visit on a long British week-end.

It's fun to see how news gets around. An AP dispatch from London prominently displayed in the *Washington Post*, June 15, offered a revelation from "a friend of Churchill," partly as follows: "Just a year ago, the Foreign Office announced the postponement of the Bermuda conference . . . Churchill's intimate says the old war leader had suffered a stroke."

TRB, Sept. 28, 1953: "Sir Winston Churchill is making good recovery from a slight paralytic stroke on the left side. . . . It came as the battleship *Vanguard* was waiting to leave Britain, June 30, to take him to the proposed Bermuda conference."

(The UP will have this any day now.)

Notes: Washington officials are forgetting the moral of Guatemala—that Point Four, lower tariffs, or similar devices are crucial; otherwise there will be Communist infiltration. . . . McCarthy's assistants Surine and La Venia will probably quit rather than have the Defense Department tell why it won't give them security clearance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Noteworthy This Week

BEHIND THE HEADLINES

The GOP's Real Boss

THE *New Republic's* predictions concerning the nature of the coming political campaign unfortunately have been confirmed. Speaking in McCarthy's Wisconsin on June 26, Vice President Nixon condemned Democrats and "the Acheson policy" for "the loss of China . . . the war in Korea and . . . war in Indo-China today." His speech not only was approved beforehand but praised afterward by the Republican National Committee. Questioned, Committee spokesmen said, "There's three or four more years of mileage in Acheson." And they promised that the campaign film *Korea—the Price of Appeasement,* which in 1950 so beclouded the meaning of the Korean struggle, would be exhumed and used again along with new gems like *The Case of Harry Dexter White* (*NR,* April 26).

President Eisenhower has ordered the Republican National Committee not to use McCarthy officially in the coming campaign. But the Chairmen of both the House and Senate Republican Campaign Committees — Richard Simpson (R, Penn.) and Everett Dirksen (R, Ill.) agree, as Simpson puts it, that "we can elect more Republicans if we use McCarthy." And four days after Nixon's speech, Eisenhower refused, at a press conference, to condemn or even protest the McCarthy line when it is used by that "splendid American," his Vice President. He had not seen it, said Eisenhower, but if Nixon made a speech of that kind, it "would reflect what the Administration was thinking."

Ah, yes—isn't that fellow McCarthy terrible?

On the day of this conference, the House passed the President's Foreign Aid bill—141 Democrats for it and only 118 Republicans. But Democratic leader Sam Rayburn of Texas rose to say, bitterly, that a bipartisan foreign policy which gets its chief support from Democrats is seriously threatened by these McCarthy-Nixon speeches.

Nixon—like Secretary of State Dulles in the area of foreign policy—has moved into the vacuum left by Eisenhower's refusal to lead. The "20 years of treason" charge will be pushed hardest in campaigns involving such strong supporters of Harry Truman's and Dean Acheson's past policies as Estes Kefauver (Tenn.), Paul Douglas (Ill.), Hubert Humphrey (Minn.).

So far, Democrats have not allowed anger to override their traditional support of an "internationalist" strategy against Communism. But almost certainly campaign charges of "losing Asia" will be countered by charges of "losing Indo-China." And once again, because a President who avows high moral purpose will not set his house in order, time and energy will be wasted in useless recriminations. More important, as US world leadership begins to be lost by default, the American public again will be confused and misled concerning just those questions to which we must find publicly supported answers if we are to regain that leadership.

"Negotiate—or Fight"

DESPITE the optimistic tone taken by most of the press, the Eisenhower-Churchill conference produced no firm answer to the question underlying Anglo-American differences on Asia: *negotiate or fight?* Britain has chosen to seek "peaceful co-existence." The question put to the US (*NR,* July 5) is "do *you* want peaceful co-existence?"—to which our leaders answer an uncertain yes; "and what do you want it *for?*"—to which they give no answer at all. Until there is an answer, it does no good to pretend that the US and Britain — joined on this issue by France—will not follow increasingly different ways of dealing with Communist China and the threat she represents.

Britain intends to follow a dual policy; in Churchill's words she will seek "peace through strength" while keeping a "friendly alternative" to war before the Communists. "Strength" would consist of a defense alliance, apparently agreed upon in Washington and ready to go, backed up by an international guarantee of an Indo-China settlement —reciprocal non-aggression pacts based, again in Churchill's words, on the "master thought of Locarno—everyone going against the aggressor." The British theory is that such pacts would involve the neutral nations of Asia in guaranteeing a line against Communist expansion. "There will never be," said Eden, "any real security in Southeast Asia without the goodwill of free Asian countries."

"Friendly alternatives" involve increasing trade with Red China in the hope of giving her an alternative to the dependence on Russia which she resents, and "giving them [the people] a chance to grasp the prospects of vast material well-being," as Churchill put it, so as to minimize the possibility of war. Inevitable in this approach is eventual support for the admission of China to the UN. The British seem ready to take that step. Indeed, they believe the UN will be of no use for solving Asian problems until the step is taken.

Since the alternative to "peaceful co-existence" is "preventive war" and "liberation," US leaders have to be for it—at least for the present. The time

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gained, however, is to be used only to build up a position of strength." And strength is defined only as a defensive alliance of nations which share our total distrust of Communists. Locarno-type pacts are rejected—the House has altered the foreign aid bill to deny funds to any Asian nation signing such a pact—because "they would not be worth the paper they are written on." This attitude goes to the heart of the issue—our leaders see Communist nations as bent on quick world-domination; Britain and others see them as nations who have interests in many ways similar to those of other nations and who will honor treaties that reflect those interests. Most of these nations agree that Communists desire world domination, but they believe that if this drive can be blocked by "strength," the other interests of the individual Communist nations, which can best be attained under peaceful conditions, will come to the front. "It doesn't follow," said Churchill in Washington, "that the men in the Kremlin will always be able to be largely independent of the opinion of the masses—I think not."

The only real alternative to a policy of keeping the peace in order to change the character of Communism would seem to be a hard-headed decision to attack now while we still enjoy—diminishing—military superiority. But the US leadership refuses both of these alternatives while failing to offer any other. This "not here, not there" position is what has lost us the leadership of the Grand Alliance in Asian matters. It is hard to see how the breach between the US and its allies can be bridged unless an alternative policy is found which blends our now divergent views and interests, thus offering a course of possible joint action. But the American public has been talked into an attitude where "negotiation" which must involve concessions, is equated with "appeasement." And the talk continues. The newspapers closest to the Administration have begun to chant—in the words of Henry Luce's *Time* magazine—that in an England which wants to negotiate "the US has no firm ally."

Senate Majority Leader William Knowland has just threatened to resign if China should be admitted to the UN, and "devote my full efforts . . . to terminate US membership." If a majority of free nations should decide to admit China to the assembly of the UN—an action we could not veto—the possibility that our present leaders, indebted as they are to the most irresponsible elements in the nation, would be forced to take this nation out is very real. Yet, if we cannot consider or create alternatives and we cannot negotiate, then we must fight. But we cannot do that either.

Dr. Smyth Dissents

THE BLANK wall between the United States Government and atomic scientist J. Robert Oppenheimer has become an iron curtain. By a 4-1 vote, the Atomic Energy Commission has declared him a security risk, unworthy of access to the secrets of the atomic and hydrogen bomb projects which his genius did so much to create.

The Commission, in affirming the adverse recommendation of the security board headed by Gordon Gray, differed with that board in several respects. It did not attest to Oppenheimer's loyalty and discretion, as the Gray board had done. And it refused to condemn the scientist for his alleged lack of enthusiasm for the hydrogen bomb project in 1949. Instead, it placed emphasis upon "proof of fundamental defects in his character" and upon associations with known Communists that "extended far beyond the tolerable limits of prudence and self-restraint."

But there was no answer to the dissenting statement of Commissioner Smyth that "there is no indication in the entire record that Dr. Oppenheimer has ever divulged any secret information." The sole purpose of the security program, apart from the prevention of sabotage, is to protect secrets and, as Dr. Smyth noted, "if a man protects the secrets he has in his hands and his head, he has shown essential regard for the security system."

The momentous issues posed by the Oppenheimer proceeding have not been put to rest by the Commission's action. Still left unresolved is the question whether the security of the nation is really any stronger by excluding a man of wisdom and genius from the programs to which he has contributed so much. (See p. 6 ff. for further discussion of this question.) Are the national interests really served by a security program which emphasizes human perfection and absolute conformity to the exclusion of larger and more realistic factors?

When informed of the Commission's decision, Dr. Oppenheimer said only that Dr. Smyth's dissent "says what needs to be said." He then expressed a hope: "Our country is fortunate in its scientists, in their high skill, and their devotion. I know that they will work faithfully to preserve and strengthen this country. I hope that the fruit of their work will be used with humanity, with wisdom and with courage. I know that their counsel when sought will be given honestly and freely. I hope that it will be heard." But it was only a hope.

New Republic A JOURNAL OF OPINION
VOLUME 131, NUMBER 2, ISSUE 2068

Michael Straight, *Editor*
Gilbert A. Harrison, *Publisher*
Helen Fuller, *Managing Editor*
Allan E. Aird, *Business Manager*

Tom Fitzsimmons, *Staff Writer*
F. R. Ruskin, *Administrative Assistant*
Eric Bentley, *Theatre Critic*
Robert Evett, *Book Editor*
Lucille Davis, *Copy Assistant*

Contributing Critics: W. H. Auden, Bruce Bliven, Dudley Fitts, Joseph Frank, Gerald W. Johnson, V. O. Key Jr., Max Lerner, Richard Lester, Arthur Mizener, James R. Newman, Kathleen Raine, John Crowe Ransom, Herbert Read, Robert Richman, Mark Schorer, Stephen Spender, Allen Tate

Washington Wire, by T.R.B. 2
Behind the Headlines 3
Secrecy and Scientific Progress 6
by L. V. Berkner
The Fight 10
by Brad Sebstad
Report from Japan 12
by Hessell Tiltman
Mendès-France and EDC 15
by Frank Gorrell
Books and Comment 16
Painting 19
Theatre 21
Correspondence 22

Published weekly and Copyrighted, 1954 in the USA by New Republic, Inc., publishing office, 301 N St., N.E., Washington 2, D.C. Editorial and business communications should be addressed to 1826 Jefferson Place, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Entered as second-class matter September 26, 1950 at the post office at Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Single copy, 20c; Yearly subscription, $7.00; Foreign, $8.00; Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Senator Douglas Talks Taxes

The Treasury's tax proposals for the next fiscal year as originally advanced were not completely the same as those which have passed the House and the Senate. They are very similar, however, and must be outlined as they were submitted, since they constitute a program which the Treasury spokesmen declare to be superior to ours.

The ultimate effect of the Treasury proposals would have been:

First: To give about $250 million in tax relief to individuals by miscellaneous liberalized deductions such as baby-sitters' expenses for working widows and widowers. Second: To give favored tax treatment to those who receive income from stock dividends, providing at the end of the third year $1.2 billion a year in tax relief. Third: To give businesses special tax treatment on deductions for plant and equipment, providing ultimate relief of $1.55 billion. In addition, other tax relief for businesses was added, amounting to about $250 million.

The average tax relief for the individual taxpayer would have been $6 a year.

Only eight percent of American families own publicly-held stock, and only eight percent of this group—that is, eight percent of the eight percent—own 80 percent of the total value of such stock: six-tenths of one percent of the American families own 80 percent of the value of publicly-held stock.

Eight percent of the 5.5 million stock-holding families, or 440,000 families, would, under the original Treasury plan, have received $906 million, or almost $2,200 apiece. This is 366 times as much as the average taxpaying families' $6. This was to be the distribution originally intended by the Treasury between the many and the few.

Under the bill as it has been passed by the Finance Committee, the average taxpaying family would get $12 a year. That is an arithmetic average, and if we consider actual families, most of them will get nothing at all. But the 440,000 families, who own 80 percent of the stock of corporations, will get 80 percent of the $840 million cost of the pared-down dividends allowance, which is $672 million, or an average of more than $1,500 apiece. This is 125 times as much as the average taxpaying family's $12.

We find the argument advanced that business and investors need incentives to induce them to invest in new plants and equipment. In this way, it is said, productivity and real wages will be higher, employment greater, and prices lower, and, hence, society will ultimately gain. Implicit in the assertion of the Treasury is a double fallacy: (1) An increase in savings does not, of itself, mean increased investments in a period of recession; and (2) investments in plant and equipment will not be made to the degree necessary to provide new jobs unless there is a market for the goods which the new capacity can produce. During the past 8 years we have invested almost a quarter of a trillion dollars in expanded business facilities—almost as much as the national debt. We need to bring consumption at least up to par before worrying about investment. As a matter of fact, the best way to stimulate investment is to do so indirectly, by stimulating consumption.

The worst provision in the bill is the one giving special tax windfalls to stockholders. I believe it to be unfair, unjustified, and ineffective. The tax credit for dividend income is not a deduction against taxable income as is true of every other deduction, but is a direct credit against the actual tax itself. A very simple illustration can make this point clear.

Suppose there are two men, one with an income of $6,000 a year from dividends; the other with an income of $6,000 a year from sources other than dividends; that each has a wife and two children. The approximate tax each would now pay would be $600 a year. The 10-percent dividend tax credit which was originally proposed when the bill came to the floor of the Senate, amounting to $600 in the case of the first man, was to be deducted not from the $3,600 of taxable income which that man had, but against the $600 of taxes which he otherwise would have paid. Even with the 10 percent limitation on the credit, the man with dividend income pays only 40 percent of the tax the man across the street would pay on his income from wages, salaries, or profits. But the dividends tax credit is justified by the Treasury on the grounds that it is justifiable relief for "double taxation." Which, so the argument goes, discriminates against corporations as against individual owners and partnerships which pay only one tax. These arguments are sophisticated but soft.

All manufacturing companies in the US earned a net profit of $11.3 billion last year, after taxes, depreciation, and all other charges, 10.4 percent on stockholders' equity. Corporate profits after taxes have doubled, tripled, and in some years, quadrupled since 1939. Stock values have also doubled in that time.

A fair and effective tax program would increase personal income-tax exemptions rather than grant the proposed special windfall to stockholders. An increase in personal exemptions would benefit every single person who pays an income tax—39 million individuals and families. The benefit would be in proportion to the number of persons whom the taxpayer must support.

The primary problem of the economy now is an inability of consumers to buy the potential output of industry at current prices—not lack of investment capital. Vast amounts of our present productive capacity already lie idle. What is needed is more consumption of goods which will bring in its wake increased sales, and hence lower inventories, higher production and more jobs.

The initial effect of a $200 increase in personal exemptions would be to pour an additional $4.3 billion of purchasing power into the economy. But the net effect would be much greater even than this, for the increased spending would go into higher profits for business, higher tax revenues to the government and to many of the currently unemployed wage earners.

It is said that if we raise the exemption limit we are taking away the obligation upon the part of many citizens to support their government. The point is that these people are already paying regressive federal and state sales and property taxes. Regardless of whose figures we use the person with a $1,000 income pays between $200 and $250 in taxes, not an inconsiderable tax burden.

PAUL H. DOUGLAS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRECY AND SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS

by L. V. Berkner

THE CASE of Dr. Robert Oppenheimer has raised fundamental questions about the secrecy practices controlling our atomic energy program. The Majority Decision of the Atomic Energy Commission, denying Oppenheimer access to restricted data, makes it unmistakably clear that the US is relying more on the guarding of "vital secrets" than on scientific progress for supremacy in the atomic arms race with the Soviet Union. Oppenheimer's "doubtful associates" (to whom he has never been accused of divulging any secret) were judged by the majority of the AEC as of more account than his capacities for future creative work.



Some of our most respected scientists, including the distinguished scientific administrator Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner, operating head of the Brookhaven National Laboratory and advisor to the Department of Defense and other government agencies, question this position. In his article which follows, taken from an address to the American Society of Chemical Engineers, Dr. Berkner examines the dangers of secrecy for long-run security.

AT THE moment America's social system is suffering from a kind of collective "nervous breakdown." We Americans may not yet have reached the state of the psychotic who thinks that four plus four equals seven, but we may have reached the state of the neurotic who realizes that four plus four equals eight, all right, but he just can't bear the idea. In our obsession with this fear, Americans look with horror at any threat to a "sacred cow" that we have been led to believe can protect us. That is why it is so difficult for us to examine the matter of technological secrecy objectively. . . .

Serious technological secrecy is relatively recent, emerging sharply as a product of the technological revolution. There are, of course, a few examples throughout history, but these were of almost insignificant importance. World War I produced two technological surprises—poison gas and the tank. Either of these should have been decisive. That they were not might be attributable to the fact that secrecy prevented sufficent training and tactical development, and consequently prevented exploitation of the potentialities of these weapons. (This failure reminds us of the lack of training of our allies in the tactical use of atomic weapons in the present day.) But military history prior to 1930 shows few important examples of technological secrecy. . . .

The coincidence of technological secrecy with the technological revolution is no accident, for as society generally became deeply dependent on technological development, so too did the military organization increase its dependence on science and technology. Initially, at least, it appeared reasonable that the military restrict the exchange of ideas having military implications on the ground that to permit the free flow of information would hand the enemy our developmental achievements "on a platter."

In the modern world, however, *all* the important areas of science have military implications, and under our present policies must therefore fall inevitably under the cloak of military secrecy. Since more and more of our scientific activity is coming within the purview of secrecy, the need for appraisal of the effects of secrecy on our scientific stature and progress, and therefore on our national security, becomes of increasing importance. It seems highly probable that a little technological secrecy, like a little poison, may be a good thing, but too much can destroy us. . . .

WE ALL know that such ideas as the laws of mechanics and the concepts of space and time derived from astronomy, together with the work of Planck on high-temperature radiation, led Einstein to postulate the equivalence of mass and energy through his concept of relativity. On this concept is based the discovery of nuclear energy. Yet today, any intelligent military organization, operating under the present rules

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and concepts, would certainly classify the equivalent of Planck's work so that it would be denied to a potential Einstein. . . . In suppressing seemingly isolated scientific bits of information of direct military value, we at the same time prevent the germination of scientific ideas of much greater scientific, social and military significance. Such really great concepts, injected into our industrial complex, can provide far greater security through technological supremacy than we could ever hope to achieve through the secrecy of technological information.

THE application of really serious secrecy to military technology seems to have coincided with the discovery of radar about 1930. During the ensuing decade, the results were not impressive. In the case of radar, secrecy seriously delayed its development, and neither technical nor tactical progress was very appreciable. As a consequence, although it was technically and demonstrably adequate to have done this relatively simple job, radar failed to prevent Pearl Harbor (a tactical failure born of military ignorance imposed by secrecy because the warning of radar was ignored). Had we made known our radar protection of Pearl Harbor, it is doubtful that the Japanese would have attempted a surprise. In any event, our own commanders would not have been ignorant of the powerful tools at their command, and the outcome might well have been very different.

Moreover, the development of airborne-radar applications awaited the war, for at its commencement we had no anti-submarine radar, no night-fighters, no means for extensive sea search. The absence of such weapons is directly attributable to the technological delays resulting from secrecy. Had airborne radar been developed and advertised openly, the consequent great progress in these developments might have so weakened the German confidence in their submarine supremacy, or in their capabilities for strategic air attack, that the war might have been prevented altogether.

Is there anything in this history to lend confidence in the security provided by technological secrecy as contrasted to the security of progress? A commission of inquiry might well examine into the whole history of the effect of technological secrecy on our national well-being.

The maintenance of the secrecy of technological information makes extensive security procedures and regulations imperative. Under these procedures the scientist cannot avoid becoming the almost unique target, because he is the source of much of the information to be protected. It is his creative ideas that produce the need for technological secrecy. Yet the application of security procedures condition the scientist to avoid contact with any idea that may lead to military application. Why should this be so? The reasons are clear.

1. If he knows no "secrets," he cannot be involved in security questions. Scientists are no different from anyone else in desiring to protect their reputations. Once they are involved in secret matters, their reputations may be destroyed by any person who makes irresponsible charges. Because many people accept the cliché, "Where there's smoke, there's fire," subsequent clearance does little to undo the damage.

2. Clearance is not a permanent status, and a scientist's reputation is constantly susceptible to multiple jeopardy. Having once been admitted to secret information or having even originated it, the scientist knows that he may be destroyed by a subsequent change of policy or by other irrelevant circumstances that may result in suspension of that clearance. During each clearance review, his entire life comes under scrutiny, and any act or indiscretion that may have had no relevance to security at the time, may arise to damn him. The threat of a review of his security clearance can be used to discourage his exploration of possible alternatives for the correction of national weaknesses—if these alternatives happen not to coincide with current policy.

3. In the process of re-associating ideas in new ways, the scientist must acquire from many sources the ideas to be associated. The development of a new concept does not occur in a flash, but is the consequence of hard thinking and long discussions with scientists of other views and of varied experience. Yet, if the emergent idea is of subsequent military importance, and is later classified, the scientist may become involved in security procedures because of the earlier discussions of his own ideas that were an essential precedent to the new concept.

4. If he has been engaged in scientific leadership in the national interest, he is inevitably involved in extensive security questioning relating to his colleagues, to scientific conferences, to the views of his colleagues and to his estimate of their intent. He must act as witness at security hearings, or render sworn statements concerning events long since past. He may unwillingly and quite improperly involve another through some misinterpretation of his meaning. The application of security procedures becomes a harassment to all involved.

5. If he expresses a strong view on some technological



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

matter that may be contrary to current or to subsequent policy he is open to the accusation of deliberate subversion. If, as a consequence of study of serious deficiency in our military position, he advocates a course of action to correct that deficiency he may be accused of conspiracy against the existing, though inadequate policy. Moreover, secrecy prevents him from stating the essential technical grounds on which his view is based. Therefore, in the simple process of doing his job for his country well, he is open to damaging criticism against which he is permitted to produce little defense.

6. In a system of widespread technological secrecy, the scientist finds it increasingly difficult to sort out from the tremendous multiplicity of facts those that are secret and those that are open. Consequently, his knowledge of secrets tends to restrict productive scientific discussions far beyond the necessity of the security system. But, if he errs, he must be certain to err on the side of safety. Therefore, the freedom of discussion, on which the maintenance of his professional competence depends, is severely hampered.

But these are not the only frustrations that "security" produces. It is the height of frustration to sit through the presentation of a scientific paper given by one who does not know that his work has been far outdistanced under the stamp of classification. Imagine the frustration of the author when, if ever, he finds this out. It is even more frustrating to the scientist, however, to conceive an idea of military importance, only to be excluded from its subsequent development on the ground that he has no "need to know," regardless of the fact that he may have much more to offer. Any interest that he may evince in the facts that are needed to further the development is looked upon with suspicion. But the height of frustration occurs when the idea is left both classified and undeveloped, because he is powerless to do anything more about it. There is no forum for debate of the decision. All of these things tend to lay a dead hand on the enthusiasm and imagination that is needed for significant scientific progress.

THE POINT is that the security process strongly conditions the scientist *not* to do those very things our country most needs. Responsible men recognize the conditioning and will not consciously permit it to stand in the way of their duty and responsibility to their country and to the ideals that it represents. But repeated applications of these security procedures makes the average scientist feel a little like the dog in the psychological experiment who is kicked every time the bell is rung. Presently he runs quite unconsciously when the bell of "military security" is rung, without waiting for the kick. *There is a limit to the frustrations experienced by the really creative scientist, beyond which his creativeness is destroyed irrespective of his willingness to serve.* The scientist originating and working with secrets, and this includes most of us, is subjected to pressures and influences not experienced by ordinary Americans. The scientist is not asking for preferential treatment, but for a relief from distracting pressures that are unknown to the ordinary American—a relief that is imperative if they are to keep America abreast of scientific progress.

I do not say these things in criticism of the security system. As long as we have widespread technological secrecy as a national policy, I doubt that these defects in its application can be avoided; nor does their existence excuse the violation of either the spirit or letter of security procedures. I point out these defects in order that we may understand the consequences of technological secrecy. The public has the right to know what we mean when we say that security procedures are damaging to the national security, that they play into the hands of the enemy. The proper balance between security derived from secrecy of technological information and security derived from progress can be understood only when all the factors are brought into the open.

THERE is one other point that we cannot escape. An important concept in science is no less important to our national security because it is produced by one who cannot be "cleared" by the arbitrary application of security procedures. We must not forget that Hitler and Mussolini abrogated their right to the atomic bomb when they drove a few leading scientists from their shores because they couldn't be cleared according to Nazi lights. Scientific greatness always rises from diversity of thought, never from conformity. Since the security procedures that support technological secrecy inevitably put a premium on conformity, they tend to prevent our nation's realization of the very greatness that we seek.

In the atmosphere of conformity, induced by our present neurosis, the very defense of the diversity encouraged by our constitutional bill of rights has been sometimes considered a subversive activity bearing on man's security clearance. Therefore, technological secrecy tends to put our best thinkers behind a wall across which they have no communication with our government. Moreover, this wall excludes many of the great foreign scientists of our time. To deprive American science of access to a great contemporary scientific thinker like Dirac is to diminish significantly American scientific stature. Can we afford the policy of banishing or banning great scientists in the face of our present perils?

But even if our public officials had all of the information available, it is doubtful whether they could evaluate it completely, adequately and correctly in the absence of the diversity of opinion represented in public debate.

Obviously, it would be foolhardy to advocate complete abandonment of technological secrecy in military matters. Social problems such as this are never all black nor all white, and intelligent balance is needed in their solution. Certainly much is to be gained

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by careful protection of the few vital secrets that need to be known only to a limited number of persons. Moreover, the judicious selection of these increases the probability of adequate protection. Thus, restriction on the specific design of a particular weapon may be militarily desirable and at the same time have no immediate significance to society. But the restriction on scientific and technical information have gone far beyond this sort of thing. What then are the factors to be considered in the establishment of desirable limits on technological secrecy? Let me try to summarize them:

1. In a democracy it is absolutely impossible to cloak a large undertaking in full security. It is like trying to hide an elephant under a paper hat. There are only two alternatives: (a) an absolute Iron Curtain of the Russian type around the country, with full control of *all* individuals, products and information, or (b) application of security to a small but sensitive area of technology in a very restricted sense. Moreover, we stand to lose most when we do try to cloak a large undertaking, for we acquire neither the security of technological information *nor* the security of progress.

2. Widespread security of technological information is inimical to the security of progress, which is based on well-developed weapons and men trained to use them effectively. In the absence of an Iron Curtain, security of information must depend on compartmentalization of knowledge. Very little compartmentalization is needed to destroy scientific progress or to restrict training and limit tactical familiarity with new weapons. Therefore, if we are to have security based on progress, the information to be restricted must be sharply defined. If, eventually, we should have to fight, we must decide now whether it is to be with effective weapons about which an enemy knows a great deal, or with pieces of paper about which he knows nothing.

3. The regulations necessary to the maintenance of secrecy in large areas of technological information condition the scientist to avoid the conception of militarily valuable ideas. Although responsible men *resist* such conditioning, the resulting frustrations inevitably reduce his creative effectiveness. Furthermore, excessive security prevents some of the world's most creative men from contributing to our national welfare.

4. The secrecy of technological information is incompatible with the public policy function of a democracy. In our elective system, there is no certainty that policy-making officials will possess the competence required for wise decisions or even understand what elements of information are important. Moreover, even assuming the wisdom of policy-making officials, sound policy results from the careful examination of the facts by the people of our nation and depends upon their diverse training and interests. Secrecy prevents the discussion necessary to such examination, and compartmentalization prevents proper evaluation even by trained specialists. The public press is the source of intelligence that *really* most influences our policy-makers and military leaders. The *New York Times* on the President's desk in the morning is probably the most influential intelligence that he receives. No adequate substitute can be found in internal intelligence, because information unevaluated by public debate lacks the convincing quality resulting from public review.

5. Widespread secrecy of technological information keeps the public ignorant of the adjustments it must make in the face of technological change. Failure to make adjustments to an evolving environment has in the past led to the extinction of a species. Yet the desire to make such adjustments can emerge only from a sound understanding of the alternatives as they become clear from public debate, or from the ultimate disaster into which society unwittingly blunders.

6. Widespread technological secrecy with respect to national capabilities may lead the enemy to underestimate our power, and encourage him in irresponsible adventures leading to war. There are many examples of this, though none can be proved absolutely, since events never conjoin in the same way in history.

"Questionable Value"

AT THE PRESENT time a restrictive policy on the publication of non-weapons technology is of questionable value. Two important factors must be considered:

1. *USSR Advances.* The policy for controlling non-weapons as well as weapons data has been based for several years on the desire to avoid any possible assistance to the USSR in her atomic weapons program. By August of last year the USSR demonstrated that she did not need to wait for our publication of technical information before achieving even thermonuclear weapons. *This demonstrated progress of the USSR in the fission and fusion weapons arts tends to destroy confidence in the effectiveness of secrecy.* (Italics ours.)

2. *Nuclear Power.* The remarkable progress and increasing optimism of the past few years in the development of power reactors indicates that a thriving basic industry is being born. While it may prosper in its first few years on controlled information and while it may not be handicapped by the harness of security practices, still it is doubtful whether the nuclear power industry can become fully grown without casting off the paraphernalia of the toddler. *In other words, it is doubtful whether the nuclear power industry can develop full strength under the present conditions of information control set by governmental fiat.* (Italics ours.)

—Dr. J. G. Beckerly, Director of Classification, US Atomic Energy Commission, in a speech at Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 21, 1954.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Present laws place our government officials under strong compulsion to suppress information without providing counter-balancing incentives for its release. This defect in the laws leads to an excessive overevaluation on the side of secrecy, just to be on the "safe" side. Those "in the know" form a kind of exclusive lodge, in which only the initiates have the power that access to information affords. . . . Anyone can impose the stamp of secrecy, but its subsequent removal is fraught with the greatest difficulty. Consequently the opportunity for colossal blunder is built into the system. . . .

A deep and searching inquiry into the restrictions on technological information is needed to determine where the public interest really lies. Such an inquiry would stand as a major milestone in our development of public policy and our social maturity. It would dispel the blind faith that more and more "secrecy" can somehow save us. It would define the kinds of technological information that should be kept secret and outline procedures for its protection. It would provide for periodic review of classified information and its release whenever that became appropriate.

We must be hard-headed when we ask: Just what has secrecy brought us? Does the record show that it has provided protection, or is this just a myth? Just where are we stronger because the enemy has been kept in the dark? Or where are we weaker because he does not know our power? Where, because of lack of official understanding as a result of secrecy, has our government failed to press a technological development that would have strengthened us? What secrets can be kept? To what extent are we failing to meet the great challenges of modern technology because inaction is hidden by the restrictions on technological information? Are we losing significant contributions to our safety and welfare that science could make? How can society meet the social implications of development if it does not have the chance to understand these implications?

And above all, what effect are these restrictions having upon our democratic institutions? And our system of free enterprise? Are we permitting secrecy to cover the rise of systems under the absolute bureaucratic control of the government beyond which no regulatory appeal can be made? And finally, the jackpot question: Is it true that because of technological secrecy we are forging ahead of the enemy? Or is it possible that we are falling behind?

In the long view, I believe that the public interest requires the freedom of substantially all scientific and technological information. The public should have the opportunity to understand and discuss the nature and implications of its potential applications. The exception must be unusual and clearly defined. The application of technology for man's benefit needs the penetrating critique that the diverse interests of our citizens can offer. Three hundred years ago Galileo wrote:

> . . . Who had ever heard that minds created free by God should submit slavishly to the arbitrary will of others? That they should submit in matters of truth to the decisions of a committee of men not qualified to judge? . . These are the novelties that carry with them the ruin of commonwealths and the subversion of the State.

The Fight

What Happened to one Young Republican in Wisconsin who thought "Joe Must Go"

by Brad Sebstad

I REALLY began to worry about the whole thing the other day at the office when a friend said, "I have to hand it to you; it must take lots of courage to do what you're doing."

We were talking about the McCarthy recall movement, and what I was "doing" was circulating petitions and running around with a "Joe Must Go" bumper sign on my car. The guy I was talking to was sympathetic to the cause and I'd gotten his name on the dotted line a couple of weeks before. I shrugged off the remark, and then about five minutes later I did a double take! "Things have really gone to hell," I announced to myself, "when it takes such a big dose of courage to stand up for a political principle."

I'd gotten into this hassle mostly by accident. I work in a small industrial plant in a middle-sized town in northern Wisconsin. Back in '52 some of us had been interested in seeing Eisenhower get the Republican nomination. We were in strong Taft country, so it was an uphill fight. As part of our strategy we decided to infiltrate the Young Republican Organization. That wasn't so hard to do—and we took over, mostly by default. They elected me county chairman. As it turned out, Ike didn't even appear on the primary ballot, so we promoted Warren. He managed to get six of Wisconsin's 36 electoral votes, although Taft won in our county.

Well, anyway, I was still chairman of the YGOP. I'd always been quite the boy for mouthing off and writing letters to newspapers and such, so a few months

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ago I wrote a nasty one about McCarthy to one of the downstate papers. In effect I said, "Enough of this party unity stuff; let's face up to what this guy is doing." I told them that I for one was tired of keeping my mouth closed just because I was a Republican. I signed it as chairman of the county Young Republican group.

Apparently when an ordinary citizen sounds off about McCarthy it doesn't mean much, but when a Republican "official" does, it's news. My letter was put on the AP wire and got around the state. It even got into some of the Eastern papers . . . and I almost dropped dead when I saw it mentioned in *Time*. Around then Leroy Gore down at Sauk City started his recall movement, and first thing I knew local citizens were coming around wanting to know where they could sign up, and I was in business with a stack of recall petitions.

I never really had too much confidence in the movement. I didn't think they'd get the required 400,000 signatures; and if they did I figured the McCarthy forces would find some way to wriggle out of a showdown election. But I guess we all regarded it as kind of a protest.

WHEN a friend of mine at the office remarked about "courage," I sat down and did some serious thinking. I certainly never thought of it that way; I guess I looked at it as more of a game—like being a Republican or a Democrat or even a Socialist had always been around our town. It was like rooting for the Braves or the Cubs. People got worked up, but you never got scared if most of the people happened to be on the other side. I asked myself, "What's going on in that man's mind? He is a fairly intelligent guy, but he must be thinking about blacklists and Gestapos and things like that."

I remembered some of the weird deals I'd run into with the petitions. One pretty good friend of mine who'd refused to sign said, "You're going to get hurt if you keep this up; you'd better lay off." He'd said it in a friendly way—not as if he or anyone else we knew was going to hurt me, but as if Big Brother was watching me. There was the woman—a nice, gentle, middle-aged woman up in the accounting office—whom I'd invited to sign. She said, "I'm certainly disgusted with Senator McCarthy and I'd like to sign, but I don't think I'd better. . . ." A fellow out in the back shop called me up one morning and told me to bring around a petition. When I looked him up the next day he'd talked it over with his wife and they'd decided that he better not "stick his neck out." I never tried to pressure anyone. They could sign if they wanted to but if they didn't want to that was strictly their business, too.

First thing I asked myself when I got off on this thinking kick was, "What could happen?" Well, maybe I could lose my job . . . but then on second thought I wasn't much worried about that—my boss had been one of the first to put his John Henry on the petition. I thought about the crank who had threatened to kidnap Leroy Gore's daughter. Then I thought about my two little girls—one's three, the other two. I remembered that a fellow a couple of counties over had had his car worked over with an iron pipe because it happened to be plastered with "Joe Must Go" signs. Well, that kind of worried me. I've got a pretty nice late model car and I'd hate to have anything happen to it . . . at least before I get it paid for.

I was still thinking like this when I drove down town last night to pick up some cigars. I stood around inside the cigar store for awhile batting the breeze with Ralph, the counterman. When I came out there was a guy squatting alongside my car fooling around with a tire. A couple of other guys were leaning up against the building across the sidewalk. I went up to the first guy and said, "What the hell are you trying to do?" He looked a little surprise; then he said, "Buddy, it isn't Senator McCarthy who should go, it's the pinkos like you."

I've never been in many fights—I've always had a little streak of yellow, I guess. But this time I got so mad so fast that I forgot about it. I stepped up and kicked that guy while he was squatting there. I got him in the shoulder and he rolled over on his back. Then he got up. I said, "You son of a bitch," and I hit him. I never hope to hit a man so hard again, because it hurt all the way up to my neck. I caught him square in the mouth and it knocked him back about six steps. He grabbed his mouth and looked sort of blank. Then he turned around and started off down the street at a fast trot. By this time I was calming down in a hurry. I looked over at the guys who'd been watching the whole thing, figuring that now I was in for trouble. One of them gave me a big grin and said, "He had that comin,' all right; he's lucky if he's got any teeth left."

AS I climbed into my car to drive home I remember having a very profound thought about those fellows: "They're like most of the people in the world about this fight that's going on—they can stand on the sidelines and cheer for either side, but they don't want to get mixed up in it because it isn't their affair."

I don't think I got over the shakes for two hours. It must have taken me six matches to get my cigar lit. I know I had those shakes from being in a fight, but it might have been something else, too. I kept thinking it isn't what these cranks and jerks are doing and saying that's important . . . it's what's happening in people's minds. A lot of people are scared and they shouldn't be, and the worst part of it is that I'm scared, too—damned scared.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPORT FROM JAPAN

REPORTING from Japan, Hessell Tiltman describes the growing threat to the development of democratic institutions from extremists of both Right and Left. The fate of moderate forces depends, he says, upon the maintenance of decent living standards. But with the reduction of American subsidies to Japan, living standards in these overcrowded islands cannot be maintained unless trade is increased. Japanese moderates must turn again to historical markets on the now-Communist mainland *unless alternative markets are offered.*



In his March 30 message to Congress this year, President Eisenhower summarized the foreign economic program with which to confound the Communists as: Aid—which we wish to curtail; Investment—which we wish to encourage; Convertibility—which we wish to facilitate; and *Trade—which we wish to expand.* A detailed examination by Samuel P. Hays Jr. ("Anti-Communist . . . But," *NR,* May 10 and May 17) of the measures offered by the Republicans to implement this program termed them inadequate—reflecting a "new form of an old disease, *Maginotitis.*"

The President's proposals dealing with *Trade* were the first of these to be put to Congressional test. After a year of "study" by the Randall Commission, the President modestly requested a three-year extension of and a very slight increase in the President's authority to lower tariffs under the Reciprocal Trade Act. They were sent to Congress by Eisenhower as the "minimum" he could accept. But on May 20, Eisenhower announced he would accept, instead of his inadequate "minimum" trade program, a simple one-year extension of the present act without increased authority to provide trade opportunities. Then on June 23, the President called Japan the "key to the defense of the Western Pacific." He admitted that unless we either continued our aid or provided her with trade opportunities, Japan "is going to the Reds!" The next day an effort by the Senate Democrats to give him his "minimum" trade program was defeated 45-32 because he failed to support it. So the President's message to Japan is in effect, "We need you desperately and you must not die; we cannot feed you, of course, but you must not eat at your neighbor's table."

The West has suffered a serious loss in Indo-China because it depended on crisis diplomacy—doing little until nothing could be done. Japan's needs are clear, as is her danger. Mr. Tiltman describes both in detail. The Administration's failure to back up its words on trade with deeds raises the question will we again delay until only the most desperate measures can save an ally?

by Hessell Tiltman

TWENTY years after I first began covering the news from this most advanced, diligent and—in so many respects—basically likeable nation of the Orient, I am still impressed by the Japanese capacity to produce leadership of quality, and for patriotism and obedience to authority. No one who has seen Japanese businessmen setting forth to conquer world markets with their belongings in brown paper parcels; or Japanese police going on duty at the double; or construction workers lined up in military formation to receive the foreman's orders at the start of the day's work, or heard pint-size girl bus conductors deliver patriotic discourses to a busload of passengers concerning the history of each town and hamlet passed, would under-estimate the world significance of the Yamato race—or the importance of the place that this united and conditioned people will most surely regain in international affairs.

But right now Japan is fighting for existence.

Both politically and economically, the nation is in a bad way. Recent disorders in the Diet, climaxed charges that the governing Liberal Party was railroading controversial measures through without adequate debate. Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida had to "indefinitely postpone" his scheduled world trip and the prestige of political parties plunged to an all-time low. With only about 46 percent of Japan's imports paid for by normal exports, both US Army "special procurement" orders and foreign exchange reserves declining sharply in recent months, increased expenditures on armaments in prospect, and claims for war reparations by the Philippines, Indonesia and Burma still outstanding, further financial assistance—whether Mutual Defense Aid or straight World Bank loans or private capital investments in Japan—represents the only alternative to economic collapse.

The government is turning to the old and tried Japanese remedy: restrictive legislation, tighter controls and a movement back to the gods of old Japan. In the meantime unrepentant ultra-Nationalists advance the in-

Hessell Tiltman is Tokyo correspondent for the Manchester Guardian *and currently president of the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan. He has covered the news of the Far East since 1934 and has been assigned to Tokyo longer than any other correspondent now in Japan.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

triguing theory that, far from Japan's owing money to the United States, the US should pay reparations to Japan for forcibly importing "emasculating" democratic processes into the former feudalistic paradise.

The result is two important trends—the political interregnum created by war and occupation is passing, and the nation is reverting to type—complete with the same ruling class, the same problems, and the same political nostrums in evidence during prewar years. The Prime Minister — as "commander-in-chief" of the revived armed forces, and controller of the recentralized police and bureaucracy—has wrested power from the Generals. But with a new Imperial General Staff being created and the conservative majority agitating for revision of the Constitution and restoration of the former prerogatives of the Emperor, few Japanese are making any bets on how long it will be before the soldiers again intrude into politics.

If the "new" Japan is thus not so new after all, it must be admitted that while the trends revealed during the two years that have passed since the regaining of independence have not been as favorable as many formerly hoped, neither have they been as discouraging as some formerly feared.

On the whole, that the traditionalist forces which favor a return to strongly centralized political patterns of the past are strong is no surprise. Surprising, if anything, is the strength displayed by the "reformist" elements, and the tenacity with which they have fought (even if rarely successfully) against retrograde tendencies.

Despite the feudal minds and stone-headed antiques still occupying high places in the nation, the continued ascendency of conservatives drawn from the prewar ruling class, and the reassertion of nationalistic impulses, it appears possible that the basic freedoms enshrined in the new Constitution may be substantially retained if national living standards can be substantially maintained. But the nation's population is approaching the 90 million mark, which in prewar days was considered the "explosion point."

THE National Diet, humbled after the fist-swinging fight in the Chamber on June 3, is learning parliamentary procedures and becoming conscious of public opinion. Japanese women, living in homes where usually the only household refinements are a cold water faucet and a charcoal fire for cooking, are a long way from achieving their advertised emancipation, but it still is impossible to imagine them losing the vote. It is equally impossible to imagine a reversal of the redistribution of land made under Occupation orders. In the *Hoan-tai*—the nation's new army—sergeants no longer slap the faces of Japanese privates to "toughen them up." In the factories, the stifling discipline of prewar years has largely, though not entirely, been replaced by easier and more informal relations between management and workers, albeit without any noticeable diminution of the paternalism which in Japanese industry is a stronger force than trade unionism. Even more significant, the younger generation is determined not to go back to the regimentation of the prewar years. Thus the present at its worst is considerably better than the past. What happens next depends primarily upon whether Japan, with its crushing population burden, is given a chance to live and make ends meet by the only means available—foreign trade.

THAT democracy remains a relative term in Japan has been proved at one end of the social scale by the whole trend of recent legislation—the Defense Secrets Protection Bill which was widely denounced as paving the way for a return to censorship; the Education bills which ban political activity by the nation's 500,000 teachers, both in and out of the classrooms; the police reform measure which recentralizes the guardians of law and order under supreme control of the Prime Minister; and Prime Minister Yoshida's recent statement that the "over-idealistic" labor laws are a luxury that Japan cannot afford and must be revised. It is proved at the other end of the social scale by the more than one thousand recorded cases of daughters of farming families being "sold" to houses of prostitution in a recent period of six months, and by the strike of Osaka silk workers who downed tools to demand not higher wages but—in A.D. 1954—freedom of religion, freedom to get married and to protest the opening of their private mail by the company!

Crop failure, due to last year's unseasonable summer and floods which reduced the yield of the nation's rice paddies by some 20 percent below average, has necessitated abnormally large food imports this year as the only alternative to reducing an official rice ration rice paddies by some 20 already insufficient to fill the country's rice-bowls for more than 15 days in each month—one more headache to plague the shaky fifth Cabinet of Prime Minister Yoshida, the dictatorial but politically astute 75-year-old statesman who in October last celebrated his fifth straight year in the highest elective office in the land.

Meanwhile, events in Indo-China and Asia generally are edging government and nation toward more realistic attitudes on security issues.

While the Diet and people remain almost unanimously opposed to sending the nation's new armed forces overseas in any circumstances, opposition to the degree of modest rearmament at present contemplated has subsided, and most Japanese now accept the fact that their nation must assume responsibility for self-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

defense—at least on the ground—as speedily as available financial and other resources permit. Thus Deputy Premier Taketora Ogata told foreign pressmen recently: "It is only natural, right and proper that we should, as an independent country, have our own defense establishment in keeping with our national power. I think it could even be said that maintenance of forces purely for defensive purposes helps to enhance international trust and confidence." A government official recently went further, admitting to me that the time will surely come when Japan will have to take a more active share in the defense of the free world.

SHAKEN public faith in the political parties, and such government moves as the revival of official visits by the Emperor to the annual festivals at Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine, dedicated to those who died in Japan's wars, and the grant of pensions to veterans of the Imperial Army designed to restore the prestige of the nation's warriors have coincided with a revival of ultra-Nationalistic activity. The extreme rightists managed to get two of their leaders—ex-Colonel Masanobu Tsuji and Takeo Kimura—into the Diet at the last general election (Mr. Truji by one of the largest majorities in the nation). But apart from that modest success, they were little heard from until criticism of the Diet, and the action of the Republic of Korea in unilaterally closing a large area of the international waters lying between Japan and Korea to Japanese fishing vessels, provided the extremists of the Right with issues calculated to win popular support.

In the past six months, these unrepentant "Double Patriots" who were the curse of Japan in the past have taken fresh heart, closed their ranks, and formed a "National Council of Patriotic Movements," alleging that "in addition to Japan's honor having been disgraced, the nation's safety has become endangered." Extreme rightists also mailed a package of dynamite to Prime Minister Yoshida's home as a gentle hint that he should resign, and one fanatic was arrested while attempting to gain access to Mr. Yoshida's villa at Oiso, south of Tokyo, with the intention of assassinating him. Proving that nothing has changed—from the revival of the practice of *banzais* for the Emperor at their meetings to the names of the ultra-rightist groups which—the *Gokoku Dan* (Fatherland Defense League), the *Junkoku Seinen Tai* (Martyr Youth Corps), etc.—are drearily reminiscent of the days when in Japan the bullet was mightier than the ballot, and the nation's leading statesmen became uninsurable risks.

Neither the ultra-Nationalists nor ultra-leftists possess immediate political significance, but both totalitarian extremes are busily assisting in the process of making up the nation's mind. And the ultra-Nationalists, arrayed in the robes of patriotism and strong in the Yamato faith, could—given the sort of support in high places which they enjoyed before the war, or a decline in national living standards—again exercise their baneful influence over the country's policies.

On many and major issues confronting the nation, decisions will have to be reached in the near future: revision of the Constitution to increase Japan's ground forces beyond the 200,000 estimated as the maximum possible strength without reviving the draft law; trade and relations with Red China; the export deficit, and the achievement and maintenance of economic stability in the face of mounting population pressures.

These problems—as all others—have been immensely aggravated by a war in which the nation lost 45 percent of its territory (including Formosa and Korea); nearly eight million tons of shipping; and $20,000 million, or one-quarter of its entire national wealth. But as Japan's rulers see it, the nation did not lose any of the three things needed to promote the national resurgence today actually in progress: the Imperial symbol, the national structure of government, and the trained, subservient, bureaucracy.

THE AVERAGE per capita hourly wage of Japanese workers is less than half that in Great Britain. But the new army is more efficient—man for man—than in prewar days; the police are on their toes (and have dossiers containing names, addresses, affiliations, personal connections and habits of Communists and suspected Communists within their areas); and the bureaucracy is on the whole better trained and informed than before the Pacific war. These three—army, police and centralized governing machine—are all that is needed to protect those truths the Japanese ruling class holds dear, or to re-transform the nation into an authoritarian State should the Diet ever vest the necessary powers in the Prime Minister.

The question mark overhanging Japan now concerns not the capacity of the nation nor its people, but whether the alignment of an overpopulated, under-privileged and proud Japan with the West will yield economic stability. Or whether unsatisfied economic needs will pile up such pressures as to force the country into closer contacts with Asian Communism. For no nation—and certainly not the advanced, virile, Japanese nation—starves quietly.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Paris Dispatch MENDES-FRANCE AND EDC

The Brussels conference of the countries of "Little Europe"—the signatories of EDC—may propose standing by the original formula. But now more than ever it is the French National Assembly that has to dispose one way or another, and quite soon, of the treaty which seeks to "blend" the six national armies into a single Western European army. The Italian Chamber of Deputies the other hold-out, may well find a majority for ratification. But its action will be taken in all probability only after—and perhaps only if—the French parliament leads the way.

The official US attitude, once monolithic in optimism about French approval of EDC, is now fragmented—as it is about some other basic elements of foreign policy. US High Commissioner Conant speaking recently at Kiel was still quite sure the French would come through with the ratification this summer. President Eisenhower in his letter of polite warning to President Coty was—for the first time—far less confident. And Secretary Dulles is no longer at all sure.

Sharing Chancellor Adenauer's doubts about Premier Mendès-France's intentions, he supports therefore a brand new West German line. Previously the German leader had clung steadfastly to the idea that the Bonn and EDC treaties made a single, indivisible package. Now both Adenauer and Dulles think the link between the two may have to be broken, and Bonn given the full legal sovereignty provided by the Bonn treaty without waiting for French action on the EDC treaty. At the Washington conference, Churchill and Eden agreed.

The attitude of Premier Mendès-France before he took office was that in such a matter as EDC "there can be no valid solution that does not have the agreement of a vast majority of Frenchmen." For a number of reasons this stand seemed to imply the view that EDC in its present form couldn't be ratified and that an alternative—keeping France firmly in the Atlantic Alliance and permitting some measure of West German rearmament—would have to be found.

First of all, it wasn't at all clear whether the "vast majority" would have to be in the parliament or in the country. There is no way—short of a highly improbable new general election—of learning whether a plebiscitory variety of support for the European army exists in public opinion. It is obvious that any foreseeable majority in the Palais Bourbon would fall far short of vastness. Moreover, the formula of a "vast majority" must be judged against the background of what is perhaps the greatest weakness of Mendès-France. Though he expressed general feelings, his government has no real mass basis in any organized political form. The only two parties, the ex-Gaullist Social Republicans and a portion of the Radical Socialists, fully represented in his cabinet definitely do not speak for a majority of the people. And the men around the Premier speak only for a highly intelligent minority cutting across formal party lines.

On few subjects, more than on EDC, have the French been so badly divided. It is, however, a mistake to assume that the division is the result of domestic or Muscovite propaganda and pressure, particularly after the start of Malenkov's divisive good-will offensive. The issue merely brings out and into glaring ugly perspective a split within French political life that goes back long before the Second World War, the "fall," the collaboration, the resistance, and then the Cold War. And EDC has been held up so long because its opponents include representatives of two very different trends among the nationalists (as against the Europeanists and the internationalists).

Leaving out the Communists and their fellow-travelers, who are concerned above all and at any cost with preventing the building either of a West German or of a Western European military bulwark against Soviet power, the enemies of EDC include both the pessimists and the optimists. The first are the Frenchmen Catonic about Germany, those who cannot escape from their fear of Germany and the Germans, those who see in EDC the certain and inevitable instrument of the rise of a Germanic empire dominating France and risking France's survival in a challenge of the East by atomic weapons. Meanwhile, the second on the other hand, are intensely pro-France; their hope for their country's future (despite Indo-China, North Africa, and domestic messes) is stronger than their fear of Germany. Their objections to EDC are based largely on the limitations they find in it to the eventual growth of independent, sovereign French power. Obviously General de Gaulle is in this category; and many of his opponents.

The pessimists maintain, for example, that through EDC the Germans will be getting the right to a brand new army; while the French will be surrendering their sovereign rights over an army already in being (and preferably along the Rhine rather than the Mekong). The optimists say that EDC takes away from France the right to determine whether and which armed forces should be kept at home in France and which be sent to North Africa, Indo-China or other parts of the French Union. They fear that the blending or fusion of national armies called for in the present treaty will damage the unity and morale of the French army, particularly if the US will favor the German national army. So they prefer a German national army to a German EDC contingent. On one point the two factions of EDC opponents agree: they object to the loss of French national sovereignty through a combination (between EDC and the Bonn treaty) that will restore West German legal sovereignty.

One important (and little known) fact about the new Premier needs to be kept in mind. He is not a renunciationist; he does not look forward to a smaller, weaker France resigned to a lesser role; but on the other hand he wants France to earn and pay for power and greatness; and he knows this will be a difficult, painful and long process.

Paris FRANK GORRELL

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS & COMMENT

The Nihilism of Modern Spain

by George Woodcock

FOR NEARLY a decade after the end of the Civil War, Spain lay ominous and almost unknown behind the shabby curtain of fear that hung over the Pyrenees. Our impressions of it were either gained from official and therefore suspect information or received through refugees, whose view of Spain tended with the years to acquire a kind of amber-encased distance from the realities of the present. Today the curtain is lifting. Travelers from Europe and the Americas are passing in and out of Spain, and, despite the terror that lingers, by no means all of them find it difficult to make contact with the people. At the same time, for the benefit of those who have not been able to land at Cadiz or cross the international bridge at Irun, there has recently been a number of interesting outsiders' books on Spain and also a trickle of good Spanish novels which show a resumption of the literary life that was interrupted by the Civil War.

The best of the books about Spain have been by Englishmen. Two or three years ago there appeared Gerald Brenan's acute analysis of the postwar situation in *The Face of Spain,* and an equally valuable volume of V. S. Pritchett, called *The Spanish Temper,* has just begun to circulate. Among the native novels the most significant, both in terms of their perception of contemporary Spanish life and also in sheer literary quality, have been José Cela's—*Pascual Duarte's Family,* his recently published *The Hive,* and a little volume of travel sketches in rural Spain, *Viaje a la Alcarria,* which, so far as I know, has not yet been translated.

The first thing that strikes one on reading one of these recent Spanish novels is the chasm of feeling that separates them from that literary renaissance of the twenties and thirties which graced European literature with the works of Unamuno and Ortega y Gasset, of Galdos and Barojo and Sender, of Lorca and Machado. That renaissance, as Pritchett remarks, "exhausted itself. Its leaders are old or dead or in exile." And, while the writers now emerging have not forgotten this departed generation, they themselves are working in an atmosphere which is inevitably dominated and changed by the Civil War and its social aftermath.

ONE THING unites them with their predecessors. It is what Barea (a survivor in spirit from the pre-Civil-War Spain) has called "the note of hunger," the note that sounds through the whole of Spanish writing, through the many centuries of what Gerald Brenan described as "the literature of a people who have scarcely ever known security and comfort." Where the moderns differ is in the scope they give to this "note of hunger." For them it is no longer a mere hunger of the body; it is rather a starvation of the spirit such as has never before appeared as a dominant factor in Spanish writing.

Tragedy and death are indeed recurrent themes in Iberian art, and their shadow hangs over the humor of Cervantes as well as over the sombre ecstacies of Zurbaran. But in the past they belonged to a pattern that also included positive elements—a purpose, a destination, a view of the good life and of the dignity with which it should be lived.

It is the lack of these positive elements that is startling about the picture of urban life presented by the new realists. Carreño's characters in *The Final Hours* range from the rich playboy down to the children of the Madrid gutters, but they are united in a crying need for love and even for any but the shallowest communication with other men. In *The Hive* Cela deliberately presents the inconsequential moments of his hundred and sixty characters in a disjointed and episodic manner which emphasizes the atomization of city living, the breakup of a cohesive pattern of society and social feeling. His people are tragic not because they are poor, but because they have no longer the resources that in the past made poverty something a man could bear with dignity.

The background of this change in the Spanish outlook is presented sensitively by Pritchett in *The Spanish Temper* He records a surprising number of people who still keep their old liberal or radical viewpoints and are ready to discuss them with a minimum of encouragement, but he also points out that this typically Spanish obstinacy in holding on to opinions does not extend to actions and that within Spain there is little evidence of that spirit of crusading liberalism which was one aspect of the literary movement of the 1930's.

"In politics," he says, "the exiles, generally, are more extreme and dated than people of the same complexion inside Spain. These wish to forget the Civil War and its appalling personal losses; the business of surviving the terrible time after the Civil War, of keeping their heads above water, of getting enough to eat, has bewildered and exhausted them whereas the exiles are fixed in the past. Beyond the frontier is Spanish pride, inside the frontier is Spanish compliance and the dread of going through it all again."

BUT, as Pritchett also indicates, this has not been the only change which the Civil War has wrought. Against the wishes of the Right and the expectations of the Left, there has been something of a revolution in social relations, a revolution which generations of liberal endeavor had not attained. Peasants are deserting the villages and streaming into the towns to form the kind of depressed proletariat that existed in England during the industrial revolution. Family life is loosening, and women, despite the church and the traditional feminine sequestration, are becoming steadily more independent. All these tendencies contribute to the rootlessness of life in the cities, to the feeling of a world in which, as Cela puts it, "everything has gone wrong bit by bit, though no one can ever quite understand why," and eventually to that ruthless contemplation of life—"without reticences . . . without charity"—which is perhaps the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

only protest that modern Spanish intellectuals are able to make.

These social changes have, in fact, undermined the basic attitudes of the liberal intellectuals who dominated Spanish literature from Galdos to Sender and who still survive in exile. Before the Civil War Spaniards, on the Left as much as on the Right, were inspired by a sense of individual human worth that involved an almost puritanical rejection of modernism in the American or English sense. If progress meant a surrender to materialist values, then most Spaniards were ready to do without it. This explains the appeal which anarchism made in Andalusia and Catalonia, for there is an austerity about the anarchist's choice of freedom in preference to ease that strikes a sympathetic cord in the Spanish mind. The anarchist peasant of the countryside around Seville looked back to a golden age of free communes, just as the Carlist peasant of Navarre looked back to a golden age of Christian theocracy; whatever the differences that made them slay each other without mercy, they were united in their detestation of what we regard as progress.

TODAY these values of the traditional Spain are influential among a fast diminishing proportion of the population. In Cela's work the contrast is clear, between the serenity he sees in the country people described in *Viaje a la Alcarria*, who can endure poverty and humiliation because of a view of life that makes these things less important than a man's sense of his own worth, and the rootless, shiftless people of *The Hive*, dissolving as individuals and as a social group in the great impersonal flux of urban living. Pritchett notes the same difference. He finds the peasants who are left in the country areas as self-reliant and basically anarchic as their fathers were a quarter of a century before; but their world broke during the Civil War; through the cracks an ever-growing stream of countrymen flows toward the swelling cities, the peasants squat in slums of flattened gasoline tins under the raw skyscrapers and the palatial residential buildings which are changing the shape of cities like Madrid.

"Industrialism and modern life," says Pritchett, "come in; a quiet process of Europeanism goes fitfully on: the factories go up, the roads are built, the dams are constructed, the movement to study abroad—begun in the early years of this century—has not been stopped. . . . In industrial regions, like Catalonia, a younger generation regards the ageing heroes of the Civil War with respect, but also with wonder and amusement. This young generation accepts the break with customs and traditions eagerly."

The disintegration of long-held patterns of behavior is indeed the most important single trend in Spain today. The State and the Church, for all their apparent solidity, rest on a foundation whose instability has been demonstrated by recent strikes in Bilbao and Barcelonia, and by student demonstrations in Madrid which turned against their official organizers. What will emerge from this process it is hard to say, but certainly it is unlikely that the conditions of the Republic of 1931-9 are likely to reappear; for it seems clear that the majority of Spaniards, for the time being at least, have had their fill of political extremism, whether of Right or Left.

Meanwhile, it is the restless, goalless urban state of mind which is providing the ripe material for the new Spanish literature, its studiously unpartisan realism, the breakdown of human contact which breeds a nihilism more hopeless than the gloomiest facets of existentialism because it does not even preserve a faith in the human personality. The younger writers present their revelation in the form of a spiritual and social nadir that is horrifying in its extremity. The nearest thing I can think of in European history to this is the state of the Russian intelligentsia in that age of dissolution which stretched from Belinsky to Chekhov, another age when a nihilist philosophy mirrored a social disorder that plunged many individuals into the depths of tragic futility. Russian nihilism also was a symptom of the disintegration of tradition, but it had its active aspect, for in its early period it was the only way in which the intellectuals could protest against the injustices they perceived. Undoubtedly the nihilism of contemporary Spain has this element of conscious protest—a protest by denial. What may come out of this mood in social terms it is impossible to tell, for the forces of nihilism are unpredictable; but for the moment we can at least say that under its influence Spanish literature is living again, even if it blooms as a fierce black flower that little resembles the iridescent blossoms of Lorca's lost Spain.

The Conservative Mind

RICHARD LEOPOLD'S biography of Elihu Root is another attempt to help reconstruct a meaningful "conservative" ideology in America. Root was a distinguished lawyer with a background in international law, Secretary of War under McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, Secretary of State in Roosevelt's second term, Senator from New York. head of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, member of the Hague Tribunal, and several times a serious possibility for the Presidency. Leopold, indeed, sees him as "the ablest, most constructive conservative in American public life since 1900."

Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition, by Richard W. Leopold (Little, Brown; $3).

Like Peter Viereck and Russell Kirk, Leopold equates the best in conservatism with the best in "Burkean" constitutionalism—respect for existing and long-developing forms and methods, skepticism about rapid innovation and "man in the mass." Root "emphasized efficient administration, balanced power with responsibility, venerated the judicial process, and sought stability in all aspects of human relations." He was probably at his best as an administrator, carrying out a then-revolutionary reorganization of the Army and drawing up instruments of government for the new American possessions of Puerto Rico and the Philippines.

A theological archetype of a conservatism—defined in terms of dignity, integrity, and respect for fundamental law and rights—has been developing in both liberal and conservative circles in recent years, and the distinguished old Yankee families of New England and New York are often to be identified with it.

Yet Leopold's biography, like John Garraty's treatment of the elder Henry Cabot Lodge, in one important respect

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

helps to destroy this image as well as to create it. Under Theodore Roosevelt, Root, Lodge, and many others were able to play dignified and constructive roles. But their talents could not blossom in the airless mediocrity of the Taft regime; and in later years, the bitter infighting under Wilson and the farcical sidestepping under Warren Harding blighted the permanent reputations of both men.

Root's moral position was somewhat dubious in 1916-17, when he criticized Wilson—although not as bitterly as Roosevelt or Lodge—for not "standing up" to the Germans, while at the same time—in a parallel to later GOP demands for "toughness" after 1945—never making the specific suggestion that we declare war. More dubious still was his position on American participation in the League of Nations. Leopold defends him, while granting his great dislike of Wilson and his intense loyalty to the Republican party and to the leadership of Lodge in the Senate. More than anything else, Root and Lodge were determined to avoid a new split of the kind which wrecked the Republican party in 1912.

Root was known internationally for his work on the arbitration of disputes; he had served in the Hague, won the Nobel Peace prize, and helped to draft the statute for the new World Court, on which he was invited to serve. In the twenties, he was very active in campaigning for American membership on the Court. But in 1919 and 1920, his role was ambiguous. In May, 1920, he wrote to Lodge that he felt it absolutely imperative that the Republican platform that year make its support of the League Charter, with strong American reservations, "clear and unmistakable." In June, at Lodge's urging, he reversed himself and drew up a deliberately vague and ambiguous statement favoring "an association of nations," frankly planned to please all wings of the party.

As the impossible Harding veered from one foreign policy position to another in the campaign which followed, Root took an even more questionable step. He drafted the famous "statement of thirty-one Republicans," released to the press on October 15, 1920. This manifesto, signed by Charles Evans Hughes, Henry Stimson, A. Lawrence Lowell, Nicholas Murray Butler, and almost the whole galaxy of conservative intellectual leadership of the day, told the American people that the election of Harding was the surest way to obtain immediate membership in an association of nations.

Leopold's defense of this step — which Henry Stimson in later years admitted to be a blunder—is very interesting for the light it throws on the conservative dilemma in 1952-54. By late 1920, he says, there was no question that Harding would be elected. The Root statement was not intended to win internationalist support for him, but rather to influence him to support internationalism:

> The most the paper could do . . . was to assure one class of voters that there was within the Republican party a group of distinguished Americans who would try to persuade the new President to take some positive action regarding a postwar international organization.

But the day after Harding was elected, he declared that "the League is now deceased." Even then Root did not protest, feeling that patience would be necessary to win over the new President. Leopold drily comments, "Patience, however, was not rewarded." He never attacked Harding publicly; but in 1926, when he was awarded a prize, ironically, by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, he bitterly castigated the "insensate prejudice" which had kept America from international co-operation.

One is reminded, of course, of "responsible conservatives" who backed Eisenhower in 1952 with the hope that their kind of support would serve as a counterpoise to nationalism and McCarthyism. Like Root and his co-signers in 1920, their devotion has not been rewarded; and the rest of us have been faced with the realization that "Burkean" idealists, however great their personal integrity, have again placed their sincere and deep-rooted loyalty to the Republican party above their private judgment.

JOHN P. MALLAN

Strength Where Needed

PAR LAGERKVIST received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1951 for a great quantity of work, the accomplishment of 40 years. In Sweden he is best known as a dramatist. He is also a poet. But American readers have seen only two novels (*The Dwarf*, 1945; *Barrabas*, 1951), an occasional story, and now this collection of short fiction written between 1920 and 1935. We can hardly take his full measure. *The Eternal Smile and Other Stories* alone, however, reveals an original, and a provocative artist.

There is a vast range here—from extended anecdote to novelette, from fantasy to a conventional medley of realism and symbolism. "Love and Death" is one paragraph long; "The Masquerade of Souls" 80 pages. There is anger, satire, tenderness, love, sometimes sentimentality, and often a fine, wry humor. In "The Venerated Bones," good citizens of two nations which have just waged a ferocious war are dismayed by rumors that the dead they venerated are fraternizing on the battlefield; an investigating commission is dispatched; sure enough, late in the night, ghosts rise out of the ground and wander back and forth across the frontier; the Commissioners, indignant, upbraid them; but the fallen heroes are astonished: "We hate each other as much as ever," they insist; "we are only exchanging bones, everything is in such a muddle."

The Eternal Smile and other stories, by Par Lagerkvist (Random House; $4.50).

Lagerkvist is best as a weaver of parables. In these he is not concerned with "real people," but with a sweep of action and a revelation. Then his style, his use of symbolism, his whole manner works a magic of atmosphere. And an American reader is reminded of how strictly we have come to limit our definitions of the "short-story" and the "novel," and what short distances our writers stray. But once having read the whole book in all its variety, the same reader is likely to wonder why some of it is so very good and some so bad.

Lagerkvist is interested in human desire and fear, consequent good and evil, the causes of these, the questions, the answers, the contradictions which men shape as they try to relate their lives to the lives of others and to the reality containing them. Happiness to him is the acceptance of the *actual*—in its diversity and paradox. The attempt

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to deny some part of that reality, to reject it, leads to confusion and misery. And love adds a dimension to the acceptance, making it positive and joyous.

But he is concerned with all this in its trans-personal aspect first. "The Eternal Smile," for example, treats of human nobility and absurdity, love, hatred, satisfaction, frustration, as these cut across and through the lives of a great mass of people. Swift, superbly drawn vignettes catch these elements of reality at work in an individual life; but the focus is never the *individual*, it is the forces that work upon and through the person. In stories like this Lagerkvist is strong—unencumbered by detail, he invents and weaves and appears as a wise, sensitive, delightful man whose sense of the tragic although profound never excludes joy, and, I suppose, his faith in life. Such tales make up about half of the collection.

When he does focus on one or two people, tries to write a conventional story, there is neither sweep nor revelation, everything grinds. Nothing happens. He simply tells the reader about the people and what they do and why they do it. It is description from a distance. "The Masquerade of Souls" is not much longer than "The Eternal Smile," but it seems to take an eternity to read. Two people, young, meet, love, marry, drift about in a universe of love, come to want a child; the son is killed in childbirth to save the mother, she retreats into neurosis, the man suffers; as they enter middle age she is discovered to be hopelessly ill, their love once again becomes everything, she dies, he tries to live, cannot and kills himself to join her. We are with these two people a long time, yet they are never real for us, as they must be since this time the story is about them, their love and not love itself. We are never even allowed to approach them, the author holds us off, tells us about them and explains. What he tells us is well said. But here the kind of conception and the techniques which are the strength and flavor of the trans-personal tales work to defeat him. It is as if he has never really *seen* how individuals live those forces he can isolate so well in fantasy. And this impression is encouraged by a confusion of intent and attitude in the story. We are told that the lives of these two people have been immeasurably enriched by their love but it is clear that they have so immersed themselves in that love that they cannot deal with the rest of reality and are destroyed. What the author thinks about this kind of loving, the basis on which he organized the story, is never clear—he drifts toward irony, then pulls back almost to sentimentality, then drifts toward irony again.

One story, however, does stand between what Lagerkvist does excellently and what seemingly he cannot do. In "The Marriage Feast," fantasy and realism are blended into a beautiful, controlled whole. Love and the rest of reality are juxtaposed meaningfully. The theme is one of the author's favorites: the humble, the crippled, the simple in spirit sometimes rise to a happiness, find an accord with reality which we all must envy; and they do it despite us.

These are the people Lagerkvist seems to *see* best—perhaps he trusts them more—and is most willing to present without comment. He is content to let his attitude be implicit in what they do and in the sequence of their doing.

A distinguished artist, Lagerkvist is here in his strength and in his weakness. Since that strength is in an area seldom explored now, it is doubly valuable.

TOM FITZSIMMONS

PAINTING

At the start of the past art season Robert Coates of *The New Yorker* noted "a critical phase" in American abstract painting—"its original revolutionary impulse is now dying out." A month or so ago Stuart Preston of *The New York Times* criticized the chaos of "semi to totally abstract painting that, week in and week out, floods local galleries." Such independent opinions, from two of the more independent critics now writing, relieve one from bias in believing that abstraction is the "official" visual mode of our day. It is true that occasionally City Councilors like to see this extreme abstraction (of the Pollock drip-school, a type of painting resurrected from pre-1914 experiments)as advanced; but beyond them, and a few Manhattan socialities, no one is much impressed by the so-called "action" painting of Pollock, Tworkov, Kline, and the rest.

Yet it must not be forgotten that the other academy, fossilized so earnestly each year at the National Academy, is an equal chamber of horrors. Much-publicized realists like Walter Stuempfig, Robert Vickery, and Henry Koerner —the last compared with Cézanne by *Time*—are contemporary American only in content; their style, story-telling verisimilitude, is pre-Raphaelite gone stale. These frustrated traditionalists, with their Burne-Jones sidewalks and Rossetti-like vacant lots, compromise good American realists and one naturally shields one's eyes from their efforts.

In between these two schools one finds that kind of quasi-cubism which wins prize after prize in the national salons, and for which fellowship grants are given. The Museum of Modern Art shows a talent at collecting this stuff, too. Here we might find rather better painters, like Victor Candell and Howard Mandel, representative: faceted, prismatic scenes inhabited by broken-up stylized people, the composition too often reposing on some cat's-cradle affair. This group appears generally at one with its times, covering an almost depressingly conservative approach to life with a patina of Modernism. These middle-of-the-road mannerists appear to be appallingly conscientious and only too obviously believe, in the words of the catalog of the Twelfth Audubon Annual, that "real progress cannot be achieved impetuously." In very little danger of offending that maxim, they are still more of a bore than the National Academy "classics" whom no one takes seriously and who do not pretend to mix in the real business of art. In a sense these latter-day prismatics are themselves responsible for the Pollock movement. Anything, one feels at the Audubon Annuals, *anything* rather than these honest old cubes!

It may well be that the present is a period of consolidation in the visual, as in the literary, arts. "The idolatry of novelty," W. H. Auden has recently written, "is more destructive than any traditional novelty and harder to cure." Cubist and neo-cubist distortion was largely coeval with the contrapuntal technique in the novel, a technique in which our present fictional masters seem largely uninterested. The painters one

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

admires at the moment are those who are consolidating, those who paint well, for whom art comes before art-politics, and who are unconcerned about semantic problems (define your problem in an Eighth Street bar, and then paint to prove you're right). Even so, our "younger" painters of consequence seem to be close on middle-age; in this age-group America has a number of solid painters, who knows a great deal about their business, such as Jack Lawrence (stylized realism), Jack Levine (expressionist social satire), Hyman Bloom (expressionist cadavers), Morris Graves (oriental, calligraphic birds), and Siegfried Reinhardt (who carries the intricate patterning of the neo-cubists to a satisfactory conclusion). It is hard to find the American equivalents in importance of those Europeans like Leonardo Cremonini or Alan Reynolds who seem scarcely to have left art school and yet demonstrate such serious and confident maturity.

What of our painters around thirty? They must struggle for proper training and show character enough to resist the fashions which will lead to facile exhibition. George Tooker, who refuses to show oftener than every three years, and Alex Colville both have Cremonini's calm and solid monumentality, without quite the Italian painter's vigor, as yet. Herbert Katzman is singularly proficient as a late expressionist and although I personally prefer a less excitable style, I admit it as prophetic—photographs of jet pilots' faces under stress exactly resemble expressionist distortions. Hyman Bloom's bloody corpses are probably the aftermath of a World War III. Another highly considered ambitious young painter is Joseph Glasco, who seems to need to express himself via his tortured surfaces. Joseph Lasker is another clever painter of obvious sincerity in this age group and sent in a splendid painting to last year's Whitney which that Museum wisely acquired.

With my colleague, Mr. Lane Faison of *The Nation*, I would not pretend that Colleen Browning is necessarily announcing the art of the future (unless that be more hopeful than one imagines), but this able painter is surely proving herself a most tactful and loving codifier of the Harlem scene. There is little sense in smearing realists like Lasker and Browning with the easy charge of sentimentality when both are capable of such austere observation and affection: Browning, especially, has shown herself able to penetrate the psychology of the colored child with perfect manners. And both painters subbornly insist on a new experience for each painting.

If this consideration has leant to the side of realism it has done so consciously. The young abstractionists, in their showings financed by the abstract galleries, seem meekly repetitive of their elders. We are asked, nay ordered, to measure them by the standards of their elders, but these high-priests in question have explicitly abandoned all standards. "By throwing quality away," writes *Art News* of Dubuffet's work, "quality is what he attains." You may measure a realist, and the contemporary content of a realist too, by great painters of the past. You can only measure an imitation-Pollock by Pollock. Handsome designs at times, yes, but, one wants to ask, *when are they going to start painting?* The point is reinforced from Andrew Wyeth's work. Personally I find Wyeth far too "worthy"—he has been compared with Robert Frost and, like Frost, often pays the price of real banality for daring to work by canons of the past. Yet if Wyeth's watercolor room at his Knoedler retrospective showed some of the stogiest realism imaginable, his tempera can be skillful and piercing and, as an American phenomenon, is vastly important.

As Lincoln Kirstein puts it, "Our elegance is resident in Shaker furniture, work- and sport-clothes, in machines; it is functional, meagre, thin, tight, but strong, delicate and austere.

Secondly, the realist tradition is in hazard from another angle. In Russia realism can only be allowed to mean socialism, which is certainly not the case here. Yet, as Herbert Bowman observes in tracing the present Russian aesthetic to Chernyshevski's explosive thesis of 1855, Russian socialist realism is "a form of active participation in life rather than an imaginative evocation of it." The artist's imagination in Russia is wholly subordinated to the process of sweetening reality, in the manner of our most debased advertising. Art is an unruly servant, to be constantly chastised, of reality, or socialism. A picture must be a colored photograph so pollyanna as to make a Main Street ad look gloomy. The American realist tradition, however, and it is a vitally indigenous one, is Western or "bourgeois," that is, free. It springs from a totally dissimilar aesthetic. Behind it lies the concept of the imagination as a mighty force, as God. Above all, the idea that a painter can comment on life by formal relationships has been, and must be, jealously preserved. Even our great *trompe-l'oeil* painters, like Harnett or Peto, made comments on life. It is essential to bear in mind this distinction between American and Russian realism for unthinking parties sometimes like to equate the two in an apology for abstract art.

So Alfred Frankfurter, editor of *Art News*, writes, "there is one matter on which the Nazis and Soviets agree . . . and that is the condemnaton and suppression of all advanced, individual expression in painting and sculpture and the exaltation exclusively of a realist, illustrative ideal." In their contexts this is true enough, but in America a dissimilar aesthetic permits vitally experimental ideas to express themselves along the realist level. Indeed, it is on this level that some of our most advanced and excitingly difficult painting is being done. Useful as the purely aesthetic definitions provided by the New York abstractionists may have been, it is essential to safeguard the free play of artistic pronouncement on life, which is part of the meaning of authentic realism. GEOFFREY WAGNER

MOST IMPORTANT

"I have found your publication one of the most important in the U.S. today, chiefly because you speak honestly, realistically, and without ideological jargon."

This is one of the many notes of praise from new readers who have found THE AMERICAN SOCIALIST the most exciting radical publication in the country.

It talks straight! It translates Socialism into the problems of our day! SUBSCRIBE TODAY! Special introductory offer: 6 issues for $1. 863 Broadway, Dept. 5, N. Y. C. 3.

Notes on the Critics

GEORGE WOODCOCK has recently completed a work on Proudhon. He is a commentator on literature for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. JOHN P. MALLAN is a teaching fellow in Government at Harvard. GEOFFREY WAGNER is the author of three novels and two volumes of poetry.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THEATRE

At the close of my second season of theatre reviewing for *NR*, I am beginning to see what some of the problems of practical drama criticism are.

The job of any critic, dramatic or otherwise, is to use the verb *to be*, the conjunctions *and* and *but*, and the epithets *good* and *bad*. The drama critic tells you what the show *is*, argues the *pros* and *cons* in a series of observations and counter-observations, and announces if, in his opinion, the total event is any *good*. He will withstand the temptation to omit the *ands* because he is always interested in the additional fact that tips the scale. He will insist on the *buts* because he likes to see the other side of every coin. Since he cannot draw back from the act of appraisal, he will not substitute modish verbiage, scientific or belle-lettristic for plain *bads* and *goods*.

The theatre critic's concern is *theatre*: playwright and actor, director and scene designer and musician. But since all these work together to interpret *life*, the critic's approach will not be merely formal. Being a journalist, the drama critic will report the news. And we can judge him by the standards we apply to other journalists. Does he spot the essential things? Has he a nose for a new trend? At any rate we can't grumble at the recurrence, in his work, of the word New. It is the critic's job to identify and describe the New Actress, the New Playwright, the New Rococo, the New Estheticism, the New Conservatism before they become the Old Actress, the Old . . . etc.

As long as a critic has the qualities of his defects, no merely human being has the right to complain that he has the defects of his qualities. Even the limitations of the art he practices are not faults, provided he recognizes them and makes allowances. The limits of theatre criticism are soon reached. Here we have no lofty form of meditation conceived in solitude, recollected in tranquility, and incorporated in large art-form or voluminous treatise. We have only a man's immediate response immediately recorded in the briefest bit of prose. Too often the *and* or *but* that would make the statement complete and comprehensive are missing; for *bad* we must read *good;* for *is, is not.* Practice the art of journalism, and even your remarks of a few months ago will surprise you. "Did I say that?" Reading reviews (including my own) of shows I have seen, I am given pause by many, all too many, distortions of the truth. The chief cause — the chief cause—the chief cause that I am aware of in my own work—is *classification.*

The New This and the New That are *classes.* The critic is all the time putting artists and works of art in categories. That is bad enough. The journalist critic goes one worse: rashly consigning his victims to this pigeon-hole and that, he has to improvise even the pigeon-holes. The critic of new art is all the time, says posterity, making mistaken judgments. The journalist-critic of new art goes one worse and maximizes his chances of error by rushing into print with his first hasty impression.

He finds it interesting to do so; that is his chief justification. As the world goes, it is not a bad one: how little there is to be said for posterity's kind of wisdom! Nonetheless, I have dismayed to see how often my own snap categories have proved a bed of Procrustes for my poor authors and actors. In fact our new actresses are often better than the New Actresses or different, our new playwrights are better than the New Playwright or different . . . and so on.

After *classification* or generality, the chief source of error is, I think, something very like the opposite. Call it *immediacy.* What I have in mind is that the drama critic has blinkers on. He sees only what he sees; it is not very much; and he records it without asking questions such as: is this what I ought to have seen? Or: is it consistent with what I have said I saw last week? When a dramatic critic looks back through a couple of dozen notices he has written, he is surprised not only by this remark or that but at totally unforeseen relationships between one remark and another. For example, the regular reader of this column might conclude that its author considers Anouilh flatly a better dramatist than Giraudoux. That is the impression given by my separate reviews of *Colombe* and *Ondine.* Several factors are involved. First, the author had no such comparison in mind. Second, he saw the plays not in Platonic purity but in particular productions. Third, there is the dual translation problem: does an author translate well? and: has he found the best possible translator? The reader is free to ask what questions he chooses; but in fairness he should also make certain allowances. Journalism is journalism. And there are times when consistency isn't worth a rap.

Something a critic says that is "wildly inconsistent with his whole theory" may be an inspiration. A drama critic must dare to say the things that don't fit if only because he is a reporter. He writes down what he in fact saw or what he in fact felt. For a dramatic critic, the primary—I don't say the ultimate—experience is live contact with the actor.

I should be sorry, however, if my collected reviews were just a mass of contradictions. I should like to think that if the phenomena reviewed are various, and my attitude to them subject both to chance variation and deliberate revision, the classifications have nevertheless some general validity, and the judgments are the coherent product of a single, though limited, mind. Pirandello thought we were totally out of touch with other people and also with ourselves at all moments but the present one: we are each a hundred thousand moments and states of mind that are unrelated to each other.

I am hoping—and indeed assuming—that Pirandello was wrong.

ERIC BENTLEY

A NEW REPUBLIC REPRINT

Sidney Hook's
Controversial Essay
Unpragmatic Liberalism

●

Quantity Prices
on request

●

New Republic
1826 Jefferson Pl. NW
Washington 6, D. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CORRESPONDENCE

► House of Unrepresentatives

In Gus Tyler's article on "The House of Un-Representatives" (*NR,* June 28, 1954), he quotes from a Report on representation in state legislatures (1949) that in Connecticut "Hartford with a population of 166,000 has two representatives; Colebrook with a population of 547 also two representatives in the lower house."

The statement, using 1940 census figures, is correct. Unfortunately, the authors of the report could have used Union (234) or Hartland (300) or Killingworth (531), each of which has two representatives and each of which by the 1940 census was smaller than Colebrook.

Connecticut differs from most states in that it has the most unrepresentative lower house in the country. Under the 1950 census definition, 77.6 percent of the population is urban but elects only 50 percent of the House of Representatives. The other 50 percent are elected by the 22.4 percent rural population. The twelve largest cities have just over 50 percent of the population and elect 8.6 percent of the House. The 23 smallest towns elect 11.5 percent of the House but have only 0.8 percent of the population. There are 65 towns with a population of under 2,500 each. Their total population of 88,592 is 4.4 percent of the total of the state, but their 89 representatives are 31.9 percent of the House.

GEORGE D. BRADEN

Plainville, Conn.

• • •

I am very much intrigued by the Gus Tyler articles on "The House of Un-Representatives." Political scientists have long been concerned with trying to make our State and Federal apportionment systems more representative, but the voters have been apathetic because substantive issues are always more exciting. These articles give a clear, readable, objective and documented picture of the atrocities which are committed in the name of representative government. I hope that these articles will stir some action by voters to demand that state legislatures correct these abuses. Maybe the articles will touch off some kind of a campaign to brand these political atrocities for what they are, and to make state legislatures a little more conscience-stricken when they tie the hands of representative government and shoot it in the back of the neck.

KENNETH W. HECHLER

Washington, D. C.

• • •

Gus Tyler's articles on representation are timely for Utah readers. You may know that there will be an apportionment amendment on the ballot in Utah next November. The amendment would abolish population as the basis for representation in our senate. Instead, each county would get one senator regardless of population. Sample: Salt Lake County 275,000; Daggett County 364.

If passed this will mean that 4 percent of our population will have veto power over any amendment to our constitution; 15 percent could block any regular legislation.

WILLIAM J. LUTTRELL

Salt Lake City, Utah

► Salutary Reminders

I am driven to annoying you, by your typos. Last week, a double "r" in the middle of "harass," and this week, in the first article I read, Mr. Johnson's "font" comes out "fort," somewhat ridiculously; for Mr. Johnson surely wrote: ". . . We have huge minorities that would thrust the dirty hand of politics into the sacrificial *font* of scholarship. . ." The habit is disreputable.

On all other points, though, I have only praise.

WALTER ROBB

San Francisco, Calif.

• • •

In the issue of June 21 on p. 17 in Gerald W. Johnson's "The Superficial Aspect" occurs a real blunder in usage —the word printed is "salubrious" instead of "salutary." A climate is "salubrious," health-giving, but a course of conduct is salutary, such as bestowing a salutary rebuke on an arrogant and presumptuous person, of course if it is effective.

HERBERT SCHNEIDER

New York, N. Y.

► Hook on Commager

The criticism of Sidney Hook's discussion of the issues raised and not raised by Prof. Commager's *Freedom, Loyalty and Dissent* sent me to your May 24th issue. Having just bought and read—and been disappointed by—Commager's book, I was roused to vigorous huzzahs by the superb coverage of every salient point in this ritualistic liberal work, by Dr. Hook. He is undoubtedly tops these days in expounding the true Middle Way between pro-Communism and McCarthyism.

WM. E. MONAGHAN

Ridgefield, N. J.

► Popular Front in Spain

I think Mr. Friedenberg's assertion ("The Paradoxes of the Spanish Civil War," *NR,* June 28) that had the Left triumphed they ". . . would have established a Revolutionary government in a blood bath of equal ferocity to that of the Right," is quite unfounded. He bases his conclusion on the fact that there were Communists in Negrin's Cabinet (one, to be exact) and on ". . . the lights of history, as we have seen it operate under the aegis of the Soviet and Popular Front 'liberation'." The assumption underlying this is that Communists controlled the Spanish Republican Government or could have done so at a later date. . . .

Mr. Friedenberg himself said there was a basic truth in the adage "Europe stops at the Pyrenees." How can he then assume that what may apply to European states must necessarily apply to polyglot Spain?

MRS. JULIA STACK

Jackson Heights, N. Y.

► Miss Perkins' "Epic"

Congratulations to Miss Frances Perkins and to the *New Republic* for the eloquent review of *The Man Behind Roosevelt.* Of course Miss Perkins' article goes much beyond a mere review: it reads as a kind of epic that deserves to be reprinted as a small book. I hasten now to read *The Roosevelt I Knew,* now that I know what a magnificent writer Miss Perkins turns out to be.

May I also congratulate you personally for the outstanding *Trial by Television* series. Really, the *New Republic* is an absolute necessity to me.

R. S. FETTERS

McKeesport, Pa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

► Maintenance of Order

The following item from the *New York Times* should be brought to the attention of the public. The *Times* had it buried where very few people would notice.

WASHINGTON, June 22 (AP)—President Eisenhower, an old Legionnaire, asked Congress today for a special appropriation of $103,000 to maintain "public order" during the American Legion's convention here Aug. 30 to Sept. 2.

This reader seriously doubts if the convention is worth 5¢ to the tax-paying public.

WILLARD B. ROBINSON

Phelps, New York

► Washington Coverage

I have just read my *New Republic* of June 21, and am moved to drop you a line of appreciation and thanks for your remarkable coverage of Washington, congressional and State politics. Since your removal to Washington, the changes in your contents, tone and treatment have been notable improvements.

VICTOR S. YARROS

La Jolla, Calif.

► Back to Pure Science

Your defense of Robert Oppenheimer in the June 14th issue was mildly heartening—you jumped on the side of the angels but for devilish reasons.

First you ably pointed out that Oppenheimer's "deep moral convictions" were interpreted by the Loyalty Board as evidence of unreliability. Then you castigate the Loyalty Board for this finding, saying that such an interpretation will discourage young non-conformist scientists from working on government projects. And this is regrettable, you say, because without the help of young men of integrity the Russians will get ahead of us in the race toward destruction.

Actually the Loyalty Board is correct. Men of conscience like J Robert are "unreliable" on these huge bomb projects simply because their humanitarian instincts automatically come into conflict with the aims toward which their achievements will be directed.

Such men will hesitate to blow up the world.

If Oppenheimer will quietly accept divorce from the war department and devote his great talents to pure science, we may fall behind in the atomic weapon race but there is a chance that we will regain leadership in more important fields.

RIDGELY CUMMINGS

Hollywood, Calif.

► Lindeman Papers

The works of Eduard C. Lindeman are being edited for publication, and we wish to include, if possible, significant letters which express his personality or philosophy. We are particularly interested in comments on social patterns, individual or inter-group co-ordination, means versus ends, social or political participation, and recreation. Letters will be copied and returned.

ROBERT GESSNER

Oakland, N. J.

► Hopi Doll Trouble

A cloud, at present no greater than the proverbial man's hand, has arisen over the Western horizon. It has, however, threatening implications for our native Americans and for many of our white Americans who make their living by the sale of Indian arts and crafts.

Many of us are familiar with one of these native crafts, the Kachina dolls, made by the Hopi Indians. Originally made for their own children to instruct them in the religious symbolism of the Kachina cult, these unique little hand carved and painted figures came to be so greatly in demand by the white man, both tourist and serious student, that an entire industry has sprung up among the Hopi to satisfy that demand. Now I am told that our former foes, now our friends and protegés, the Japanese, with their imitative "genius," are mass producing what they call Kachina dolls, and that these are being imported to retail for 20¢, whereas the genuine, Indian hand-made, sell from 75¢ up.

The motto, "Trade, not aid," makes a great deal of sense. But when it comes to copying an item of one of our few true native handicrafts, and competing with a people who have already suffered all too much at our hands, it seems time to question how far we should go with that policy.

KAY BISCHOFF

Old Albuquerque, N. M.

BANDWAGON

FLANKED on the speakers' platform by the state's two GOP senators, Butler and Bealle, and GOP Congressman Miller, President Eisenhower said:

"I do want to tell this student body that no matter what they hear about Washington, D. C., I have two Senators and one Congressman here today with me to prove that we do need brains."—*ADA World*, June 1954.

"I HAVE nothing but admiration for General Eisenhower . . . but in my opinion there are a lot of people who've been giving him advice who are sympathetic to social progress ideas. . . ."—Rep. Wint Smith of Kansas, quoted in *Life* magazine, June 21, 1954.

WALL STREET reasoned that the market ought to go down now that business is improving.—*Chicago Daily News*, June 8, 1954.

MOSCOW, June 12 (AP) — Red Star, newspaper of the Soviet armed forces, complains that Soviet Army officers are shirking their setting-up exercises and warns that one cannot afford to be flabby in this age of atomic weapons. "The body of a person who is well trained physically is able to withstand much larger doses of radioactivity," the paper said.—*New York Times*, June 13, 1954.

THE other change [in the N. Y. State reapportionment law] involves the boundary between the Fifth and Sixth Senate Districts in Queens. An error in the bill gave the Democrats a chance to pick up an additional Assembly seat.—*Rochester Democrat and Chronicle*, June 8, 1954.

Our readers are invited to contribute; $2 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, c/o New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. — THE EDITORS.

RESIDENT THEATRE STOCK COMPANY | GUEST STARS PROFESSIONAL STAFF
COMPLETE ADULT RESORT
Vacation with the Nicest People Ever . . . Informally. With a full daily & unusual schedule of activities, recreation, sports and entertainment—planned for adults.
SEND FOR OUR UNIQUE PROGRAM
NIGHTLY ENTERTAINMENT
ALL SPORTS - FREE INSTRUCTION
Tennis Courts · Pool & Lake · Golf Cage · Crafts
Boating · Handball · Archery · Sculpture
Painting · Social · Folk · Square Dancing
WISCONSIN 7-8926
A DELIGHTFUL HIDEAWAY IN THE MOUNTAINS
CHESTERS FOR ADULTS
WOODBOURNE N.Y. TEL WOODBOURNE 1150

PRINTED BY NATIONAL PUBLISHING CO., 301 N ST., N. E., WASHINGTON 2, D. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Beloved and Revered Future President"—

A salutation which took twenty years to come true! . . . from a letter written in 1912 by Louis McHenry Howe to Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Says Frances Perkins: ". . . a readable and interesting book, of considerable importance, because of the light it throws on the political setup now marked for permanent significance as the New Deal."

Political Book Club Value!

THE MAN BEHIND ROOSEVELT

by Lela Stiles

$3.25 Including Postage

REGULARLY $4.75

The story of Louis Howe, the man who dedicated his entire life to one purpose . . . to make another man President. Lela Stiles' book gives new clarity to the Age of Roosevelt—both *why* and *how* it came about. Order this new Political Book Club selection today!


The Story of LOUIS McHENRY HOWE
THE
MAN BEHIND
ROOSEVELT
The fabulous, fascinating story of how one man's faith made FDR President and changed the course of American history
by LELA STILES

NR POLITICAL BOOK CLUB
1826 Jefferson Pl. NW Washington 6, D. C.

Send me.....copies of "The Man Behind Roosevelt" at $3.25 per copy. I enclose $.....

NAME .....

ADDRESS .....

CITY ..... ZONE ..... STATE .....

Order from the Political Book Club and Save Over 30%

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED